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The beginning of professional careers is often characterised by intensive job
mobility, which may influence wage progression. In this study, we aim to
measure the immediate impact of different types of job moves on subse-
quent hourly wages. We use the Spanish section of the European Commu-
nity Household Panel and work on a sample of young adults. Propensity
Score Matching and difference-in-differences are combined to disentangle
the impact of long-term and short-term, direct and via unemployment, vol-
untary and involuntary and one-time and multiple job mobility on subse-
quent wages during the period 1995-2001. We observe a positive impact of
both direct and voluntary moves and a non-scarring effect of involuntary
moves, both via unemployment and multiple job moves, but long-term in-
terruptions do have a negative impact on wages. 
Key words: job mobility, wage mobility, propensity score matching.
JEL classification: J31, J63.
T
he impact of job mobility on wages is a very important and controversial
issue in Labour Economics. In most of the theoretical approaches (human
capital, job search and job-matching as well as career mobility models),
young people are assumed to acquire positive wage gains from (voluntary)
mobility. Nevertheless, in Spain they often move neither voluntarily nor di-
rectly between jobs. Moreover, high turnover rates often mean repeated job sepa-
rations. This should erode wage gains from mobility in the Spanish youth labour
market.
This paper aims to study the rewards for different types of job mobility at the
beginning of the professional career in Spain in order to find out whether inten-
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hor would also like to thank Arnstein Aassve, Stefano Mazzuco and Marco Caliendo for their use-
ful comments. The paper has particularly benefited from very valuable comments from two anony-
mous referees and the Associate Editor. The usual disclaimer applies.sive job mobility erodes wage progression. To that end, a sub-sample of young
people (under 29 in 1994) was drawn from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP hereinafter) and the subjects were observed from 1995 to 2001. In
order to control for endogeneity in the movements between jobs and unobserved
heterogeneity, the selected empirical strategy will consist of difference-in-differ-
ences propensity score matching (DID-PSM) with multiple outcomes. 
Results show that, after observed and unobserved heterogeneity are con-
trolled for and when observationally equivalent ‘stayers’ and ‘movers’ are com-
pared, returns on recent mobility vary depending on the type of movement. With-
in the first year after the interruption, direct and voluntary moves are rewarding,
and involuntary moves and those via unemployment do not necessarily slow wage
growth down. Multiple movements (observed within a single year) do not seem to
result in lower wage increases. Those needing more than one year to find a new
job seem, instead, to be negatively affected by the interruption. Nevertheless, the
latter two sub-samples are small and caution should be taken when deriving con-
clusions from them. 
The contents of the paper are organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the
main theoretical and empirical literature on the link between job mobility and
wage dynamics. The database and the sample are presented in Section 3. Section
4 is devoted to the main methodological problems regarding job mobility and
wage mobility and to explain our empirical strategy. Section 5 shows the main re-
sults from the difference-in-differences propensity score matching and, lastly,
some conclusions are drawn from these results in Section 6.
1. JOB MOBILITY AND WAGE MOBILITY, THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The connection between job mobility and wage mobility has attracted much
attention in theoretical and empirical literature. Different theoretical approaches
have highlighted two main methodological problems tackled in empirical work:
the role of unobserved factors and endogeneity in job mobility. Two arguments
support the unobserved factors problem: unobserved productivity and unobserved
transferability and/or deterioration of human capital. The first argument [Blumen
et al. (1955)] hypothesises inherent (in)stability amongst workers, correlated with
productivity and, hence, with wages. Later, contract models [Lazear (1986)] fore-
casted wage increases as a result of mobility, since firms poach the best employ-
ees. Mobility indicates unobserved differences in productivity, which explains
wage growth differentials between movers and stayers. 
As for transferability and deterioration of skills, human capital models point
out the investment in employer-specific human capital, part of which is not trans-
ferable [Becker (1962); Parsons (1972); Hashimoto (1981)]. Through on-the-job
and formal training, workers accumulate firm-specific skills, which result in high-
er earnings, reducing relative gains from job mobility. Therefore, if firm-specific
skills influence earnings, experienced movers risk incurring losses if they move
between jobs.
The approach explained above is based on the assumption that job mobility
is voluntary. However, several hypotheses rooted in human capital theory indicate
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6wage losses (“wage scar”) amongst displaced employees. Unemployment erodes
human capital and skills, decreases productivity and, subsequently, re-employ-
ment wages. If employers take past unemployment experience as an indication of
productivity [Vishwanath (1989); Pissarides (1992)], they may offer lower wages
to previously unemployed workers1. 
A second crucial empirical problem in the job mobility – wage mobility liter-
ature is endogeneity: mobility may be a way to maximise lifetime income, as job
matching, occupational mobility and job search models will assume. 
Job matching models predict a positive effect of job mobility on wages since
workers quit jobs to seek better matches [Jovanovic (1979a)]; if they succeed in
their search, wages will be higher in the new jobs. Stable matches will be an indi-
cation of productivity [Jovanovic (1979b)]. The model predicts steeper experi-
ence-wage profiles for movers, but not necessarily higher wages in the end. The
job-shopping theory [Stigler (1962)] and the training approach in Mortensen
(1988) make similar predictions. Sicherman and Galor (1990) also expect higher
wage increases for movers than for stayers as a result of occupational mobility be-
tween jobs and employers, provided skills are transferable across occupations. 
In a similar vein, job search models also suggest that voluntary mobility will
generate positive wage gains [Burdett (1978)]. Job mobility results in higher wages
when the worker moves directly between jobs but may result in lower wages if she
becomes unemployed and her reservation wage subsequently decreases. 
Internal labour markets and segmentation hypotheses [Doeringer and Piore
(1971); Edwards et al. (1975)] also pay attention to endogeneity but in a different
way: mobility from the external/secondary labour market into the internal/primary
labour market or between primary segment jobs is expected to result in wage in-
creases. Otherwise, wage losses are also plausible. 
Last but not least, when movements between jobs are cumulative, the initial
profits may vanish, and scarring effects may be stronger if separations are em-
ployer-initiated [Keith and McWilliams (1995); Stevens (1997)]. Indeed, initially
positive effects become negative when mobility is seen not as an isolated past de-
cision but as a cumulative process [Munasinghe and Sigman (2004)].
None of these approaches may fully describe the link between mobility and
wage dynamics. Moreover, they are observationally equivalent. Empirical evidence
is vital to detecting causality in the link between job mobility and wage mobility.
Still, the underlying argument to this causality is very difficult to disentangle. 
There are several strategies in the empirical literature for dealing with endo-
geneity, structural models being but one of them [Flinn (1986); Antel (1991)]. A
heavily used alternative is instrumental variables (IV). Examples of papers using
IV are Althonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991), both reassessed by Altonji
and Williams (2005), followed by Light and McGarry (1998), Topel (2001) and
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(1) However, there are other possibilities. Antel (1991) shows that spells of unemployment
amongst voluntary movers make job searches more intensive and allow for better matches as a re-
sult of the search process. The alternative hypothesis is that unemployed workers’ search intensity
may be weaker because links to the labour market tend to fade while people are unemployed. Lefranc (2003), amongst many others. More sophisticated strategies have been
developed by Lillard (1999) and Abowd and Kang (2002). Lillard models job
turnover and job duration in continuous time jointly with the wage time series for
that job, while Abowd and Kang (2002) resume and revise the results of Altonji
and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and Lilliard (1999) in a new simultaneous es-
timation of wages and tenure. 
As for the second key methodological issue, unobserved heterogeneity, it has
been frequently treated via fixed effects estimations [Light and McGarry (1998);
Arulampalam (2001); Gregory and Roberts (2001) and Munasinghe and Sigman
(2004)]. 
The present article focuses on Spanish youth and distinguishes several types
of job mobility: voluntary versus involuntary, direct versus via unemployment
and one-time versus multiple movements. We also distinguish between short-
term (short interruptions within a year) movements and long-term (longer inter-
ruptions, within two years) movements between jobs. Moreover, we detect re-
peated mobility within a year2. Since job and wage mobility are more intensive
during the early stages of working life [Bartel and Borjas (1978, 1981)], this
strand of the literature is often based on samples of young workers [Antel
(1991); Topel and Ward (1992); Light and McGarry (1998)], as is the case in the
present work.
We contribute to the literature with an empirical strategy which attempts to
deal with both endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, namely, difference-in-
differences propensity score matching. Gash and McGinnity (2007) and Ham, Li
and Reagan (2006) use this technique to study wage growth as well. The former
compare wages, wage growth and labour market outcomes of temporary workers
relative to a matched sample of permanent workers with similar characteristics in
Germany and France. The latter measure the effect of internal job migration on
subsequent wages of young men in the U.S.. We also contribute to our knowledge
of the Spanish labour market by adding several nuances to previous literature
[García-Pérez and Rebollo-Sanz (2005) and Arranz et al. (2005)], such as focus-
ing on youths and allowing for a more exhaustive typology of movements be-
tween jobs. 
2. THE ECHP, A FIRST LOOK AT THE SAMPLE
The ECHP gathers information on several socio-economic aspects in the Eu-
ropean Union, including labour market issues. It is longitudinal in nature and the
information about job characteristics is quite rich. These two features make it very
relevant for our study. The information on job characteristics allows us to com-
pute (both gross and net) hourly wage and tenure with the employer. The former
is computed from the current monthly wage and the length of the working week.
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(2) The wage effects of cumulative mobility have not received as much attention as the distinction
between direct mobility and mobility via unemployment or voluntary and involuntary mobility. Keith
and McWilliams (1995) and Stevens (1997) are good examples of papers on cumulative mobility.Tenure in the current job is derived from the starting date of the relationship with
the current employer. 
There is no explicit question in the survey about recent changes across em-
ployers. Job mobility is computed when the time between two subsequent inter-
views in employment (usually, around one year) is longer than the tenure in the
current job reported in the second interview. For completeness, we have used the
calendar information regarding monthly status during year t-1 to detect job inter-
ruptions between two subsequent interviews. We distinguish between “short-term
interruptions” (within a year) and “long-term interruptions” (within a two-year
span). Job interruptions and their impact on wage growth are only observable
among youths reporting at least two (either consecutive or two-year distant)
wages. This condition is not randomly distributed and it calls for a correction of
the selection bias, as explained in Section 3. 
Every employed person will also report whether she experienced unemploy-
ment before accessing the current job and why she left the previous one. The first
question will allow us to distinguish between direct movements and moves via
unemployment detected from 1995 until the date of the current interview3. The
second question enables us to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
movements4. Lastly, the use of information on monthly labour market status be-
tween each pair of subsequent interviews allows us to distinguish between one-
time and multiple (when there are two or more job interruptions between the two
interviews) interruptions. 
In order to observe wage increases, we consider workers who were under 29
years old in 1994 and who registered at least two positive subsequent5 wages dur-
ing the period 1995-2001. Otherwise, wage increases would not be observed.
Studies on youth in Mediterranean countries usually admit youths to be up to 29
or even 34 years old. Allowing for up to 29 year-olds in the initial sample is, in
our case, crucial for young university graduates to be well represented in the sam-
ple. Unfortunately, sample sizes are not large enough to allow for a separate
analysis of men and women. Gender is, though, a control variable in the PSM
equation.
Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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(3) We start the analysis in wave 2 (data corresponding to 1995) because wave 1 (1994) has no in-
formation on the type of contract, which is a very important variable in defining the probability of
a job interruption (our propensity score equation). 
(4) Voluntary job mobility is detected when the interviewee reports having left her previous job
because she found a better job, because she got married, or because she had to look after her own
children, resume her education, do military service or even retire. Family reasons are a very rare
cause of job mobility amongst Spanish youths. Involuntary job moves refer to interruptions obliged
by the employer, the end of the contract, the sale or closure of the firm, the need to look after
others (not children), one’s own illness or following a partner who moved. In the question about re-
asons for leaving the last job, “other reasons” is a residual category which only accounts for 5% of
the sample. The corresponding observations have been excluded from the analysis since we were
not able to distinguish whether they had left their jobs voluntarily or involuntarily. 
(5) When the observation window is two years long, the requirement is to register non-missing
wages in t and t+2.Revista de Economía Aplicada
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Let us now report the incidence of job mobility and the size of wage growth
amongst the different types of young movers versus stayers in Spain. Table 1
shows the main transition rates from employment, split into four types of job in-
terruptions. During the period of observation (1995-2001), around 30% of all ob-
servations in employment experienced at least one interruption. Most job inter-
ruptions last less than one year. When we focus on these short-term interruptions,
we see that more than half of them were involuntary, nearly half of them required
a spell of unemployment and multiple interruptions within a year were quite in-
frequent. Wages in wave t (before the potential interruption) were higher amongst
stayers than among all types of movers. 
As regards wage growth, Table 1 shows that certain types of movers experi-
ence significantly higher wage increases than stayers6: this is the case of workers
experiencing short-term interruptions, voluntary movers, direct movers and those
that experienced a one-time interruption. No significant wage increases compared to
stayers were detected in those who registered a long interruption, involuntary
movers, those who experienced unemployment and those who registered more than
one job interruption between the two interviews7. As a result, wages in t+1 (t+2 for
long-term interruptions) are more similar for successful movers compared to stayers,
and the wages of those who experience some sort of negative mobility lag behind. 
In our empirical strategy, we have compared stayers and movers by matching
stayers and movers with a similar propensity to experience a job separation and
return to paid employment. This propensity has been estimated via a multinomial
logit model for each type of job move on the basis of a set of explanatory vari-
ables related to personal, job and regional characteristics. Table 2 shows the mean
values for those variables for stayers and all types of movers. It shows that stayers
are more experienced than movers and have been working with the current em-
ployer for longer. They are, consequently, a bit older than movers. Long-term
movers, involuntary movers, those moving via unemployment and those with
multiple interruptions hold tertiary education degrees less often. Movers more
often look for a job before the interruption, and are initially worse paid. Their sta-
tus in their current job (measured by the ISEI, International Socio-economic
Index) is a bit lower and usually below the average for their qualification and gender.
(6) This may be seen in our target variable, the difference between the log of the wages at the be-
ginning and at the end of the observation window (diff in diffs). For instance, simple t-tests for
equity of means in the distribution of wage increase (diffs in logs) show that short-term movers, re-
gister a significantly higher relative wage increase (0.172) than stayers (0.126), whereas wage
growth among long-term movers (0.133) does not significantly differ from stayers’, i.e., the diffe-
rence between the two means is not significantly different from zero.
(7) Wage growth among this type of job movers is computed as the relative difference between the
hourly wage in the interview in wave t and the hourly wage in the interview in t+1 provided there
has been more than one job interruption between t and t+1 regardless of the actual wages in the in-
termediate spells. Although we are aware that this strategy entails missing important information,
we are not able to compute hourly wages for intermediate employment spells between the two in-
terviews. Moreover, in order to generate really comparable outcomes for one-time movers, stayers
and multiple movers, the time gap between the two observations of wages must be the same (na-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.They work in the public sector much less often than stayers and, as expected, they
hold temporary contracts much more often than stayers do. They are more often
supervised (and do not supervise anybody). Sometimes their jobs do not require
prior specific training, and they are paid for their training less often than stayers.
They experienced unemployment before the current job more often than stayers,
and they live in regions with higher unemployment rates and lower employment
rates. The proportion of married youths is lower amongst movers. Movers are more
often employed in construction and less often in finance and real estate and public
services. Negligible differences are found between stayers and movers as regards
overqualification, working hours, full-time or part-time status, the incidence of for-
mal education while in employment and devoting time to child care. 
Apart from objective employment and personal characteristics we also control
for subjective information, namely, satisfaction with several job characteristics
(wages, job security, type of work, working hours, working times, working condi-
tions and distance to job) and other aspects of life (main activity, financial situa-
tion, housing situation and leisure time). Movers are, on average, more dissatisfied
with their jobs than stayers. Voluntary movers and “multiple movers” (those who
move more than once within a single year) tend to be more dissatisfied with wages
and their financial situation. Those experiencing unemployment, long-term inter-
ruptions, involuntary moves and multiple interruptions are more dissatisfied not
only than stayers but also more than those registering direct, voluntary, short-term
and one-time interruptions. Differences in satisfaction as regards activity and fi-
nancial situation are similar to the job-related ones. Finally, no significant differ-
ences in satisfaction with regard to leisure time and housing situation are found.
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY ADOPTED
3.1. Why Difference-in-differences propensity score matching?
Difference-in-differences propensity score matching may overcome both en-
dogeneity in the main explanatory variable (i.e., job mobility) and unobserved
heterogeneity. First of all, it is an alternative to IV8, since it compares individuals
with a similar propensity to move between jobs as a way to control for endogene-
ity. Furthermore, it has common features with before-after estimators, which are a
common strategy for tackling unobserved heterogeneity9. 
Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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(8) The main problem with IV is that it is very difficult to find a good instrument, particularly in
the context of young people. While some authors use home ownership as an instrumental variable
for job mobility in samples of adults, in the case of youths (and, more particularly, in the case of
Spanish youths) this variable does not register enough variability. 
(9) If control of unobserved heterogeneity does not cancel the explanatory power of mobility, we
should accept a causal link between the two variables. However, the rationale behind this relations-
hip, that is, the causal mechanism, is beyond the scope of this paper. The causal mechanism in the
job mobility-wage mobility relationship may come from either job search, job matching and/or
specific human capital considerations. The three arguments are not self-exclusive and it is difficult
to determine which of the explanations carries more weight. Generally, researchers use information
about the three possible explanatory factors. For instance, tenure in previous jobs is often used as a
substitute for specific human capital accumulated in former jobs; satisfaction and wages in In the PSM strategy, we take different kinds of transitions between jobs as
different “treatments” for workers to maximise their lifetime income. If workers
moved randomly between jobs, a direct comparison of wage growth between
movers and stayers would yield unbiased estimates of the average effect on the
“treatment” (movement). However, workers do not move randomly and random
assignment to different types of movements must be simulated. PSM compares
pairs of workers who are similar to each other in an exhaustive number of (observ-
able) characteristics and differ in the type of “treatment” (movement) they register.
If selection into treatment were exclusively based on these observable characteris-
tics, matching would yield unbiased estimates of the average treatment effects.
This is quite unlikely since selection into treatment may also be grounded on unob-
servable characteristics [Caliendo and Hujer (2005)]. The inclusion of control for
unobservables is possible by combining matching with difference-in-differences
[Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998)], which is preferable to com-
mon/standard propensity score matching [Smith and Todd (2005)].
3.2. The evaluation problem in a multi-treatment context
This paper compares the outcome of several types of movement between
jobs. In the evaluation literature, this is labelled as “multiple treatment”. Pioneer-
ing papers on multiple treatment are Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000). Larsson
(2003) implements the technique presented in Lechner (2001). In what follows,
we use Lechner (2001) and Larsson (2003) to present the multiple evaluation
problem. 
Consider participation in (M+1) mutually exclusive treatments, denoted by
an assignment indicator T ∈ {0, 1, …, M}. We will use the term “treatment” for
each type of movement between jobs. The set of variables that may define the
probability of each treatment (covariates) is designated by X. The outcomes of the
treatments (the increase in wages from t = 0 to t = 1) are denoted by {Y0,Y 1,… ,
YM}. We know neither what the increase in wages could have been for stayers had
they moved nor what the increase in wages could have been for movers had they
stayed with their initial employers: for m = 1 (short-term, voluntary, direct or
“one-time” moves), only Y1 is observed, so the remaining M outcomes are called
counterfactuals. 
The evaluation problem consists of defining the effect of treatment m com-
pared to treatment l for all combinations of m, l ∈ {0, 1, …, M}, m ≠ l. We want
to compute the so-called average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect in the eval-
uation literature. The ATT effect may be presented as follows:
θ0
ml = E(Ym – Yl | X, T=m) = E (Ym | X, T = m) – E (Yl | X, T=m) [1]
θ0
ml in equation (1) denotes the expected average treatment effect on treatment m
relative to treatment l for participants in treatment m. It may be decomposed in the
following way:
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former jobs may be used as a substitute for initial quality of the previous job match, and job search
intentions should play the same role as job search strategies. θ0
ml = E(Ym – Yl | X, T=m) = 
=E (Ym | X, T = m) – E (Yl| X, T=l) – [E(Yl | X, T=m) – E (Yl| X, T=l)] [2]
The latter right-hand-side term is the bias conditional on X, which is as-
sumed to be zero. The technique consists of replacing the unobserved outcomes
of the participants in treatment m had they received treatment l with the outcomes
of the participants in treament l with the same X characteristics [Blundell and
Costa Dias (2000)]. 
As Larsson (2003) notes, the average treatment effect is not symmetric in the
sense that θ0
ml ≠ - θ0
lm. This is due to the fact that participants in treatments m and
l differ in a non-random way. The average causal effects defined by equation [1]
can be identified under a given assumption, called the Conditional Independence
Assumption (CIA): the selection between the groups of participants in treatment
m and treatment l is captured by a vector of observable characteristics, X. In order
to accept the CIA, the researcher needs quite a rich data set to claim to be control-
ling for all the factors influencing both the propensity to receive a given treatment
and its outcome. The vector of variables characterising jobs and satisfaction in the
ECHP is very exhaustive. Our X vector consists of 34 characteristics10 (see Table
2 for a display of mean values of all of them for all stayers and types of movers).
However, as we will see later, it might not be exhaustive enough.
A formalisation of the CIA assumption in the multiple treatment case is
available in Larsson (2003), and the identification problem and the estimation
procedure are described in Lechner (2001) and Larsson (2003). This procedure
entails estimating the ATT effect for every pair of treatments twice: first, using
treatment m as the treated group, and treatment l as the control group, and then,
the other way around. As we always compare three possible situations (namely,
stayers, “type A” movers and “type B” movers), we compute six ATT effects in
each of the four typologies of job separation considered. 
3.3. Matching and Difference-in-Differences
The CIA is a very strong assumption. It is very difficult to assert that by
monitoring a set of observables we are actually explaining all the determinants of
movements between jobs. Heckman et al. (1998) proposed combining matching
with difference-in-differences (DID). In doing so, we may control for selection
into the treatment group caused by unobserved variables [Aassve et al. (2006)].
The main matching hypothesis is now stated in terms of the before-after evolution
instead of levels [Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)]. It means that controls have
evolved from a pre- to a post-treatment period in the same way as treatments
would have done had they not been treated. We perform the matching on the vec-
tor of variables X. Instead of comparing Y (logarithm of waves) for movers and
Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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(10) As a consistency check, the same estimations were obtained with a less exhaustive set of con-
trol variables in the propensity score equation, keeping only objective aspects of the job as covaria-
tes (23 variables). Results for this second specification are available in Davia (2009).stayers in t+1, we now compare the mean change in wages from one period t to
another, t+1, following the difference-in-differences approach:
DID = E(Ym
t+1 – Ym
t ) – E(Y1
t+1 – Y1
t) = E(∆m) – E(∆t) [3]
As Aassve et al. (2006) explain, under the assumption that unobserved het-
erogeneity is time-fixed, its effect will be netted out by taking the first difference
[Heckman et al. (1998)]. The DID-PSM estimator is argued to be more robust
since it eliminates temporarily invariant sources of bias [e.g., Dehejia and Wahba
(1998, 1999) and Smith and Todd (2005)]. The effect of the treatment can now be
estimated over the common support in the context of longitudinal data as follows:
DID – PSM = Ep(X|T = m) {[E(∆m | T = m, p (X)) – E(∆t | T = l, p(X))]| T = m} [4]
where p(X) is the propensity to participate in each treatment (the propensity
score), obtained from a multinomial choice model, given the set of characteristics
X used to perform the matching. Under the matching assumptions, the conditional
independence remains valid when controlling for P(X) instead of X.
Expression [4] may be written in a more formal way [Blundell and Costa
Dias (2000)] as:
[5]
where MMDID denotes “method of matching with difference-in-differences”. wml
is the weight placed on an observation l comparison for an individual receiving
treatment m. This weight is the distance between those treated with treatment m
and l based on a kernel (Epanechnikov) function on the propensity scores of ob-
servations in treatment m and l. Finally, wm accounts for the re-weighting that re-
constructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. It reconstructs the out-
come of the treated sample by re-weighting with kernel weights [Blundell and
Costa Dias (2002)]11. 
The matching procedure based on the PSM implies that all variables have to
be balanced between treated and control units. This is the so-called balancing
property. Following Smith and Todd (2005), we use a t-test for equality of means
for each covariate, X, before and after matching. Accepting equality of means be-
tween treated individuals in group m and matched control units in group l means
that unit controls are not different from those that are treated in group m except
for the treatment status. The balancing property is satisfied in most of our esti-
mates. The complete set of results is not displayed here since it would require 24
tables (4 typologies of job interruptions times 3 possible “treatments” times 2
ATT effects per outcome (θ0
ml and θ0







lT m m YY w Y Yw =− () −− ()     ∈ ∈ ∑ 1 0 1 0 T T ∑
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(11) Re-weighting is necessary if the group of the treated individuals is larger than the group of
controls due to oversampling of treated individuals. This is often the case here since, in the multi-
treatment context, we compute two ATT effects per outcome (θ0
ml and θ0
lm). The procedure implies
taking first treated m as “treated” and those under treatment l as “controls”, and switching the roles
afterwards. Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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(12) The standardised bias is a measure of the distance in marginal distributions of the X – varia-
bles in the propensity score matching equation. For a given covariate X, the standardised differen-
ce before matching is the difference of the sample means in the full treated and non-treated sam-
ples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the full treated and
non-treated groups. The standardised differences after matching is the differences of the sample
means in the matched treated and matched non-treated samples as a percentage of the square root
of the average of the simple variances in the full treated and non-treated groups. Table 2 displays
the overall (across all covariates) bias before and after matching, which becomes smaller after mat-
ching in all cases. 
(13) The propensity score is estimated before and after the matching. The first one is necessary to
perform the matching on the propensity score, whereas the second one is used as a quality check of
the matching. This second estimation of the propensity score uses a sample of participants and
matched non-participants only. Then, the pseudo-R2 of the propensity score equations are compa-
red: the pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors X explain the participation probability. But if
only treated and matched non-participants are taken in the second propensity score equation, there
should be no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 of
the propensity score equation should be (and is) fairly low after matching. 
(14) I thank one of the referees for pointing out this issue in a prior version of the paper.
standardised bias over all the regressors in Table 2 for the 24 combinations of
treatments and outcomes. Columns F and G in Table 2 display the bias before and
after the matching12, when it becomes considerably smaller. An additional indica-
tor of the quality of the balancing is the comparison between columns H and I in
Table 2. They register the pseudo R2 of a probit on the conditional probability of
treatment, before and after the matching13, and in all our specifications it becomes
considerably reduced after the matching. After testing several specifications of the
propensity score matching equation, the specification finally chosen for this arti-
cle is the one that reduces both the bias and the explanatory power of the propen-
sity score equation most (for an alternative specification and the relevant ATT, see
Davia (2009).
The main problem in the estimation of standard errors of the ATT effect is
that the estimated variance of the ATT effect should also include the variance due
to the estimation of the propensity score. The common solution to this problem,
bootstrapping, is implemented in the module developed by Leuven and Sianesi
(2003) for STATA.
3.4. Sample selection bias
Our sample consists of youths with at least two consecutive observations of
wages. For two-year long observation windows, there can be up to two waves be-
tween two comparable observations. This is quite a restrictive selection that must
be taken into account in our empirical strategy14. In order to do so, we have com-
puted the probability of reporting non-missing wages for all respondents in two
subsequent interviews (or two waves later for potential long-term movers). This
likelihood has been estimated via a binomial probit model of a pool of all young
respondents for waves 2 to 7 (or 6 for potential long-term movers). The explana-
tory variables may be classified into two groups: those that influence the likeli-
hood of being interviewed in the next wave and those that influence the likelihoodof being employed in the next interview. The first group consists of a set of house-
hold and personal variables. Household variables include whether the household
splits in any of the following interviews, whether it has recently moved to the
house, whether it will move in any of the following interviews and whether the
members of the household have recently migrated or will migrate during the fol-
lowing interviews. Personal variables include living alone, not being present at
home in the following interview, leaving the survey prematurely and the year of
entry into the survey. Variables assumed to affect the likelihood of being em-
ployed in the subsequent interview are gender, educational attainment, age, status
as head of the household, holding an open-ended contract, working in the public
sector and potential experience in the labour market (grouped into three dum-
mies). Results are reported in Table 1, together with the mean values of the vari-
ables used in the model. 
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Table 1: SAMPLE SELECTION: PROBABILITY OF BEING EMPLOYED
IN TWO CONSECUTIVE INTERVIEWS (RESTRICTED SAMPLE) OR IN T+2 (INITIAL SAMPLE)
Initial sample Restricted sample
Coef. z Coef. z Mean
values
Male 0.203 11.09 0.201 10.80 0.509
Upper secondary -0.176 -7.47 -0.188 -7.83 0.327
Tertiary -0.024 -1.10 -0.036 -1.59 0.442
Age in the first interview 0.032 12.76 0.031 12.40 21.768
The HH will NOT split during 
the observation window -0.36 -5.73 -0.166 -6.83 0.741
The interviewee is the head 
of the HH 0.259 11.59 0.270 11.87 0.232
The interviewee lives alone -0.157 -2.67 -0.184 -3.07 0.019
Open-ended contract 1.146 54.45 1.157 53.90 0.185
Public sector worker 0.661 19.90 0.645 19.04 0.062
The HH moved to that address
less than 3 years before the 
first interview 0.093 2.88 0.098 2,95 0.099
The HH will move during 
the observation window 0.022 0.94 -0.033 -1.41 0.304
The HH has recently migrated
or will migrate during 
the observation window -0.154 -3.81 -0.212 -5.08 0.049
The HH will split in the 
following interview 1.560 22.82 2.680 25.77 0.025Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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Table 1: SAMPLE SELECTION: PROBABILITY OF BEING EMPLOYED IN TWO CONSECUTI-
VE INTERVIEWS (RESTRICTED SAMPLE) OR IN T+2 (INITIAL SAMPLE) (continuation)
Initial sample Restricted sample
Coef. z Coef. z Mean
values
The interviewee will not be 
present in the following 
interview -1.155 -23.98 -2.253 -24.34 0.105
The interviewee will abandon
the survey before wave 8 (2001)
From one to four years of LM -0.114 -4.38 -0.026 -0.98 0.172
experience in the first interview -0.151 -5.99 -0.145 -5.66 0.726
Five or more years of LM 
experience in the first interview 0.137 4.12 0.133 3.93 0.094
Entered the survey in wave 3 
(1996) -0.167 -4.72 -0.163 -4.53 0.077
Entered the survey in wave 4 
(1997) -0.247 -6.67 -0.250 -6.62 0.080
Entered the survey in wave 5 
(1998) -0.332 -6.28 -0.354 -6.53 0.037
Entered the survey in wave 6 
(1999) -0.525 -8.93 -0.515 -8.65 0.031
Entered the survey in wave 7 
(2000) -0.953 -11.13 -0.926 -10.72 0.021
Intercept -1.501 -19.98 -1.481 -19.35
Total number of cases 33001 33001
Log likelihood  -14055.3 -13578.2
Pseudo R2 0.2451 0.2583
LR chi2(22)  9126.6 9458.04
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000
Proportion of interviewees in 
initial sample 0.252
Proportion of interviewees in 
restricted sample 0.243

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The estimated probability has been included in the set of regressors X of the
multinomial logit used to define the propensity score15. Therefore, when matching
similar treated individuals/groups/samples (in treatment m) and controls (in treat-
ment l), we try to match observations with a similar propensity to belong to the
sample. Table 2 shows that, in all cases, stayers register a higher probability of re-
porting two subsequent waves than movers. The distance in this likelihood is greater
between stayers and long-term movers, involuntary movers, those moving via un-
employment and multiple movers than between stayers and short-term, voluntary,
direct and “one-time” movers. These differences confirm the need to control for
sample selection; otherwise, we would omit an important variable in vector X.
3.5. Matching algorithms and common support 
The matching algorithm, Kernel matching, creates a kernel-weighted average
over multiple units in the comparison group (for a survey of the main algorithms,
see Caliendo and Kopeining (2006)). Together with local linear matching, it is one
of the algorithms recommended by Heckman to be used with DID matching. Addi-
tionally, it is not affected by the problems of nearest neighbour algorithm as regards
the use of bootstrapping to compute standard errors of the ATT effect [Abadie and
Imbens (2006)]16. The general expression for Kernel matching is as follows:
[6]
where wml is the distance between those treated with treatment m and l denoted in
[5], G(.) is a kernel (Epanechnikov) function, P(X)m and P(X)l are the propensity
scores of observations in treatment m and l (controls), and an is a bandwidth para-
meter. After several tests, we chose a 0.05 bandwidth parameter17. We only work
in the area of common support and define it by a trimming procedure which is
meant to restrict the common support region to those values of (X) (the propensi-
ty score) that have positive density within both distributions of (X) across those
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(15) I am very grateful to Marco Caliendo for his suggestion about how to tackle sample selection.
(16) Abadie and Imbens (2006) are quite critical of the use of bootstrapping in the nearest neigh-
bour algorithm. They argue that, due to the extreme non-smoothness of nearest neighbour mat-
ching, the standard conditions for the bootstrap are not satisfied, leading the bootstrap variance to
diverge from the actual variance.
(17) We think it is a good compromise between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the true
density function: high bandwidth values yield a smoother estimated density function, therefore leading
to a better fit and a decreasing variance. On the other hand, underlying features may be smoothed away
by a large bandwidth but this increase biases the ATT effect estimate [Caliendo and Kopeining (2006)].
(18) In defining a trimming of 5%, we exclude not only those points for which the estimated density
of the propensity score is exactly zero, but also an additional 5 percent of the remaining P points for
which the estimated density is positive but very low. By excluding those individuals with the lowest 5
percent of values of P from the common support, we are constraining the common support and the
number of available matches (increasing variance), but allowing for better matches (reducing bias).4. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of the DID – PSM are displayed in Table 3: the observed out-
come to be compared to the ATT, the bias and the standard deviation, together with a
95% confidence interval for the estimated ATT. Table 3 displays the result of a match-
ing with the complete set of 34 covariates (see Table 2 for a description of them). 
As mentioned in Section 3, in a multi-treatment context, PSM must be done in
two directions, comparing each group against each of the others. This is because,
in the multi-treatment case, the average treatment effect is not symmetric in the
sense that θ0
ml ≠ - θ0
lm19. We therefore estimate both θ0
ml andθ0
lm for each pair of
“treatments.” The difference between the observed differentials in wage growth
across movers and stayers and the estimated ATT proves that the matching analy-
sis contributes to adjusting the biased observed effect. If the ATT estimates were
non-significantly different from the observed effect, job mobility and the type of
job mobility itself should not be taken as endogenous, but the analysis shows that
the empirical strategy used here (DID-PSM) has contributed to a better under-
standing of the relation between job mobility and wage mobility.
The first outcomes displayed in Table 3 refer to the effect of short-term versus
long-term movements. Differences in wage growth for both short and long-term
movers against stayers were significantly different from zero in the unmatched
sample: short-term movers’ wage growth was higher than stayers’, long-term
movers’ wage growth was slightly higher than stayers’ and short-term movers’
wage growth was higher than long-term movers’. In the matched samples, differ-
ences in wage growth are negative and significant when we compare long-term
movers against both stayers and short-term movers. This means that long-term
movers register relative wage losses (lower wage growth) compared to the other
groups. Once endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for, the
corresponding advantage for short-term movers is reduced to one-third of that ini-
tially observed, and the relatively tiny advantage for long-term movers turns into a
significant disadvantage. Anyway, we should qualify our results because of the
small sample of long-term movers (see Table 2), which, compared to that of stay-
ers, makes a quite unbalanced distribution of treated and control samples20. These
Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
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(19) As mentioned in Section 3, this asymmetry is due to the fact that m and l differ in a non-ran-
dom fashion [Lechner (2001)]. This sample selection bias affects the validity of some of the results.
The asymmetries among the ATTs are more pronounced the larger the imbalance in the sample sizes
of the groups compared (i.e., when comparing multiple movers and involuntary movers with sta-
yers). Anyway, when this asymmetry is more pronounced, the ATT are not significantly different
from zero. The observed differences between the means of the target variable (wages increases mea-
sured in logs) between such types of movers and stayers were not significantly different from zero.
In such cases, matching confirms the lack of an important effect of job mobility even when obser-
ved and (time-constant) unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for. Moreover, results across speci-
fications are very consistent in most of the combinations of treated groups and controls. 
(20) Davia (2009) shows some differences in the ATT of multiple movers versus stayers and the
stayers-involuntary movers comparisons. Since only the ATT for the stayer-long-term mover is
significantly different from zero, it is the one where differences across specifications deserve
more attention. In this comparison the ratio controls-treated is 10:1. In such cases, since theRevista de Economía Aplicada
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Table 3: RESULTS FROM DID PSM. ATTS EXPRESSED AS DIFFERENCES
IN RATES OF WAGE GROWTH
Long-term and short-term  Observed ATT  Bias Std.  95% Conf.
moves across jobs estimate Err.1 Interval
Short-term moves-stayer 0.0476 0.0135 -0.0003 0.0129 -0.0117 0.0388
Stayer-Short-term moves -0.0476 -0.0259 -0.0010 0.0166 -0.0585 0.0067
Long-term moves-stayer 0.0076 -0.0483 0.0041 0.0204 -0.0884 -0.0083
Stayer-Long-term moves -0.0076 0.0587 -0.0015 0.0271 0.0054 0.1119
Short- Long-term moves 0.0400 0.0616 -0.0013 0.0229 0.0166 0.1065
Long- Short-term moves -0.0400 -0.0634 0.0005 0.0213 -0.1053 -0.0214
Voluntary versus  Observed ATT  Bias Std.  95% Conf.
involuntary movements estimate Err.1 Interval
Voluntary job mob-stayer 0.0612 0.0439 0.0004 0.0123 0.0196 0.0681
Stayer-voluntary -0.0612 -0.0434 0.0011 0.0147 -0.0722 -0.0146
Involuntary-Stayer 0.0091 -0.0103 0.0005 0.0113 -0.0325 0.0120
Stayer-involuntary -0.0091 0.0031 0.0001 0.0139 -0.0243 0.0304
Voluntary-involuntary 0.0522 0.0480 0.0020 0.0172 0.0143 0.0818
Involuntary-voluntary -0.0522 -0.0543 -0.0007 0.0170 -0.0876 -0.0210
Direct moves versus moves  Observed ATT  Bias Std.  95% Conf.
through unemployment estimate Err.1 Interval
Direct move-stayer 0.0439 0.0293 0.0006 0.0111 0.0076 0.0511
Stayer-direct move -0.0439 -0.0302 -0.0004 0.0124 -0.0546 -0.0059
Indirect move-Stayer 0.0157 -0.0124 0.0012 0.0132 -0.0383 0.0134
Stayer-indirect move -0.0157 -0.0093 0.0001 0.0177 -0.0441 0.0255
Direct- indirect move 0.0283 0.0402 0.0000 0.0179 0.0050 0.0753
Indirect-direct move -0.0283 -0.0500 -0.0001 0.0156 -0.0805 -0.0194
One-time versus multiple  Observed ATT  Bias Std.  95% Conf.
movements estimate Err.1 Interval
One-time movement-stayer 0.0308 0.0094 0.0004 0.0095 -0.0093 0.0280
Stayer-one-time movement -0.0308 -0.0177 0.0008 0.0116 -0.0404 0.0050
Multiple movement-Stayer 0.0147 0.0032 -0.0064 0.0346 -0.0648 0.0713
Stayer-multiple movement -0.0147 -0.0104 0.0025 0.0403 -0.0896 0.0689
One-time-multiple movement 0.0161 0.0172 -0.0011 0.0301 -0.0419 0.0763
Multiple-one-time movement -0.0161 -0.0142 -0.0044 0.0307 -0.0744 0.0461
1. The standard error has been computed via bootstrapping (500 replications).
Source: ECHP (1995-2001), Eurostat.results are consistent with Arranz et al. (2005), which shows that job interruptions
have a negative impact on wage dynamics that is stronger the longer the interrup-
tion is (particularly if it entails a spell of unemployment).
The results of estimated wage differential effects of voluntary versus invol-
untary mobility and non-mobility confirm the expected results in the literature:
moving voluntarily improves wage growth significantly more than staying in the
same job, and a parallel (but negative) result is obtained for stayers versus volun-
tary movers. Those moving unwillingly do not perform significantly worse than
stayers, and the result is confirmed when comparing stayers to involuntary
movers. Finally, voluntary movers perform significantly better than involuntary
movers, and vice versa. Comparing equivalent workers of different groups instead
of the mean values of the outcome variable across groups slightly reduces the ef-
fect for voluntary interruptions and, in the case of involuntary movers, the correc-
tion is not strong enough to make the estimated wage increase differential become
significant. Results are consistent with those of Arranz et al. (2005), where wage
gains from voluntary transitions and non-scarring effects of involuntary transi-
tions are found compared to stayers in a sample of adult (18-58 year olds) males.
The third outcome studied refers to wage growth of direct job-to-job transitions
compared to movers who experience a spell of unemployment between jobs. Here
the results are somewhat less significant than in the previous outcome, but it may
still be observed that direct (job-to-job) moves are more rewarding than staying with
the same employer. Movers via (short-termed) unemployment and stayers do not
differ in terms of subsequent wage growth, and moving directly from one job to the
next is better than experiencing a spell of unemployment in between. Those who
move directly between jobs experience a slightly more pronounced wage increase
than stayers and a considerably higher one than those who move through unemploy-
ment, even if it is short-lived. Compared to what was seen in the first stage of the
descriptive analysis, the effect of job-to-job transitions is considerably reduced
(nearly halved) once matching is performed, while the relative advantage of going
directly from one job to the next compared to spending time unemployed increases
(is more pronounced) in the matched sample. The wage premia for direct job-to-job
transitions is also observed in García-Pérez and Rebollo-Sanz (2005)21; they also
find a relative disadvantage for movers through unemployment compared with both
job-to-job movers and stayers. This penalty for transitions through unemployment is
somewhat larger for youths than for adults when comparing stayers but similar
comparing job-to-job movers. 
Job mobility and wage growth at the beginning of the professional career in Spain
29
matching is performed on the propensity score, the algorithm may match certain movers with dif-
ferent stayers in different specifications of the propensity score equation. And if the control group
composition varies slightly across specifications, the ATT will accordingly vary across specifica-
tions. This is why we need to qualify our results for these particular groups and take advantage of
the results stemming from other papers based on different methodology or samples.
(21) They label job-to-job transitions as voluntary and transitions through unemployment as invo-
luntary. This is due to the fact that they work with calendar variables in the ECHP and they are not
provided with the precise reasons for moving in every single interruption they find. Using spells of
unemployment as a proxy for willingness to move is an extended practice, so we may compare our
“(in)direct” interruptions with García-Pérez and Rebollo-Sanz’s “(in)voluntary” interruptions.The final set of results in Table 3 deals with one-time versus multiple move-
ments. Initially, those who move just once experienced a significantly higher im-
provement in their wages compared to stayers. When similar observations are
compared in the common support area, these differences are wiped out, and those
who move only once do not register better results any longer22. Multiple movers
do not perform significantly worse than either stayers or one-time movers. Results
in this particular case need to be qualified due to the strong imbalance between
the number of multiple movers and stayers in the common support. This imbal-
ance has two effects: the computed ATT is sensitive to specifications of the PS
equation (although never significantly different from zero), and a smaller reduc-
tion in overall bias (see Table 2) is achieved after the matching compared to other
types of mover-stayer comparisons. 
To sum up, results indicate positive effects of voluntary and direct moves,
non-scarring effects of movements via unemployment and involuntary move-
ments, and no significant impact of multiple versus one-time movements within a
single year. When the observation window is widened up to two years and longer
interruptions are observed as well, the expected negative impact on wage dynam-
ics arises. However, the latter two groups are very small and results must be inter-
preted with caution. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The present article provides a comprehensive picture of the effects of wage
mobility on wages amongst young Spanish people. Given the high temporality
rates in Spain during the 1990’s, young Spaniards registered the highest job
turnover rates in the European Union and were also some of the most affected by
unemployment and involuntary job interruptions. This made their wages very vul-
nerable to movements. However, we find that the wage vulnerability of young
Spaniards was not very strong in the short term. Our results should be qualified,
since our sample is far from being universal. The results of the estimation process
are focused on the “common support” workers, affecting the external validity of
the sample. 
We have observed a positive impact of direct and voluntary movements and
no scarring effects of moves via unemployment and involuntary moves compared
to remaining with the same employer. Moreover, multiple interruptions within a
year do not seem to be scarring, either. When we widen the observation window
to two years to allow for long-term interruptions, we do observe a negative effect
of long-term interruptions on wage dynamics, though. Nevertheless, the results of
the latter two types of job interruptions need to be taken with caution. Our esti-
mates refer to the first wage observed after the movement has taken place, but
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(22) Bear in mind that one-time movers include all types of movers as long as they register only a
single transition between jobs throughout the year; they may therefore be either voluntary or invo-
luntary, and either direct or via unemployment. This explains the non-significant estimate, since it
is the result of combining both rewarding and non-rewarding short-term transitions. after some time at the new job, wage differentials between movers and stayers
may have vanishised. Youths may also overcome initially scarring transitions via
rewards to tenure. It could also happen that returns on mobility decrease with time
if movers repeatedly move between jobs during a longer period. The future re-
search agenda therefore includes the widening of the observation window, looking
either at wages two years (or later) after the new job is found, or at cumulative
movements within a wider observation window. 
What type of theoretical framework do our results support? Once unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity are controlled for, there is still room for a positive
impact of direct and voluntary job mobility on wage growth. Therefore, the mod-
els that support the hypothesis of a mere unobserved heterogeneity problem would
be rejected. Besides, job matching models and job search models hypothesising
positive rewards for voluntary mobility are supported. However, with the technique
used here and the information available, we are unable to disentangle the true
mechanism behind wage increases when young workers move between jobs. Are
productive workers poached by other firms? Do movers have more knowledge of
their productivity and opportunities in the labour market? Do movers take advan-
tage of the transferability of skills and human capital? The non-scarring effect of
moves via unemployment and involuntary movements may be interpreted as fol-
lows: in a very dynamic youth labour market such as the Spanish one, mobility is
so widespread that it affects all sorts of workers, not only the weakest/least pro-
ductive. This may also explain the lack of a scarring effect of unemployment and
involuntary moves when looking at short-term interruptions. 
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33RESUMEN
El inicio de la vida laboral es un período de intensa movilidad que puede
influir en las trayectorias salariales. Pretendemos aquí medir el impacto
de distintos tipos de movilidad laboral sobre el salario hora en España.
Para ello estudiamos una muestra de jóvenes españoles extraída del
Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea. Combinamos Propensity Score
Matching y Diferencias en Diferencias para explorar el impacto de la
movilidad a largo y corto plazo, directa y a través del paro, voluntaria e
involuntaria y “única” frente a “múltiple” sobre los salarios subsiguien-
tes. Observamos un impacto positivo de la movilidad directa y la volun-
taria, y no detectamos un efecto estigmatizador de la movilidad involun-
taria, la “múltiple” y la que se produce a través de un episodio (breve) de
desempleo. Sin embargo, las interrupciones de más de un año tienen un
impacto negativo en los salarios posteriores. 
Palabras clave: movilidad laboral, movilidad salarial, propensity score
matching.
Clasificación JEL: J31, J63.
Revista de Economía Aplicada
34